Вышел подробный комментарий по поводу состоявшегося FOMC от главного экономиста GoldmaN Sachs Яна Хатциуса
Главная идея этого комментария: мы видим большие шансы, что ФОМС возобновит количественное смягчение в конце этого года или в начале 2012 года
В виду отсутствия времени комменты на русском будут очень краткими.
From Jan Hatzius: QE3 Now Our Base Case
Summary
We now see a greater-than-even chance that the FOMC will resume quantitative easing later this year or in early 2012. We have changed our call because today's statement suggests that the committee's reaction function to incoming economic news is more dovish than we had previously thought. Although Fed officials still expect a gradual decline in the unemployment rate, they made a conditional commitment to keep the funds rate unchanged "at least through mid-2013" and implied that they would employ additional policy tools in case their economic forecast deteriorated further. This would probably mean more QE if their forecast converged to our own modal view of a flat-to-higher unemployment rate through the end of 2012, let alone our downside risk case of a renewed recession.
Full note:
It's official: the federal funds rate is highly likely to stay at its current near-0% level until 2013 (or later). Although this has been our forecast all along, today's FOMC statement was nevertheless more dovish than we had anticipated in two respects:
1. The policy commitment to keep the funds rate at "...exceptionally low levels...at least through mid-2013" was more aggressive than we had anticipated. Some commentators today expressed disappointment that this is still a conditional commitment, i.e., Fed officials kept an "out" if growth is much stronger and/or inflation much higher than expected. But that was not a surprise. The surprise was the fact that there is a date at all (for the first time ever in the history of Fed communications) and even more so the fact that the date is almost two years in the future.
Сюрпризом был тот факт, что был указан срок сохранения низких ставок ( впервые в истории заявлений Феда), и еще большим сюрпризом был факт, что этот срок уходит в будущее почти на два года.
2. The easing bias in the last paragraph of the statement was more explicit than we had anticipated: "The Committee discussed the range of policy tools available to promote a stronger economic recovery in a context of price stability. It will continue to assess the economic outlook in light of incoming information and is prepared to employ these tools as appropriate." The phrasing somewhat echoed the promise in the September 2010 statement "...to provide additional accommodation if needed...", which sealed the deal for QE2. In our view, the committee's explicit easing bias suggests that the threshold for additional easing in terms of downward revisions to the committee's forecast is relatively low.
Явный намек Комитета на количественное смягчение предполагает, что порог для начала QE в рамках пересмотра прогнозов в сторону понижения является относительно низким.
The implication is that the committee would probably ease policy further if its economic forecast converged to our own, more downbeat view. While the committee still expects a gradual decline in the unemployment rate, our own modal forecast is a flat-to-higher rate through the end of 2012. In addition, we see a recession risk of about one in three, and if there was indeed a recession the committee would of course ease further.
Кроме того, мы видим риск рецессии примерно 1 к 3, и если рецессия действительно случиться, то ФОМС безусловно предпримет меры по смягчению.
If there is additional easing, it would likely take the form of QE. After all, "these tools" mentioned in the statement presumably need to be more powerful--or at least not much less powerful--than the action taken today in order to avoid a sense of anti-climax. This means that they are unlikely to consist of small incremental steps such as a commitment to keep the balance sheet large, a gradual shift of the securities portfolio into longer maturities, or a cut in the interest rate on excess reserves from 25 basis points (bp) to zero. This leaves the stronger options, which include QE as well as even more aggressive forms of easing such as rate caps (a form of QE in which the Fed promises to buy as many securities as needed to hit a longer-term yield target), a price level or nominal GDP target, or interventions in non-government securities markets (for which funding from Congress would be needed). Of these, "conventional" QE is very likely the option with the lowest hurdle, and the first one to be deployed.
Хатциус считает возможным развертывание даже более серьезных мер QE, чем обычная покупка долгосрочных казначейских бумаг.
Although QE3 is now our base case, it is not a certainty. We see three main ways in which our revised call could turn out to be incorrect. First, of course, the economy may turn out to be stronger than our forecast. In this case, Fed officials would not need to revise down their forecast, and would probably not ease further.
Second, inflation might pose a higher hurdle to additional easing than we have allowed. There are only tentative signs of deceleration in core inflation, and inflation expectations show few signs of breaking lower despite the recent weakness in the economic data and risk asset prices. This is a risk to our view, although the stickiness of inflation expectations might already reflect an assumption by the market that the Fed will ease, in which case inflation expectations would fall sharply if the Fed failed to deliver.
Third, the anti-Fed backlash late last year might argue against further QE. That is possible, but the problem might be reduced via a slight tweak in the policy's design. That is, Fed officials might choose to specify the policy not as a large-and-scary upfront number but a smaller monthly flow of purchases. Although the substantive differences are small--e.g. a $600bn purchase over eight months is basically the same as a $75bn-per-month purchase that is expected to last eight months--the cosmetics of the flow approach might be more appealing. Moreover, it would also be more flexible because the committee would revisit the program from meeting to meeting.
Хотя QE3 теперь наш базовый вариант, это вовсе не то, что он обязательно случиться.
Хатциус приводит 3 случая, при которых QE не будет: улучшение в экономике, инфляция выше заданных уровней, негативная реакция на завершившиqся QE2.
Хатциус считает возможным задание ежемесячного объема покупок.
While these points could pose problems for our call, we disagree strongly with one argument against further QE that we heard frequently today--namely that the three dissents from Presidents Fisher, Kocherlakota, and Plosser indicate "the end of the line" for further Fed easing and difficulty for the chairman to get his way. On the contrary, we view Chairman Bernanke's willingness to live with the dissents as a strong signal that he and the rest of the Fed leadership view the need for renewed easing as more important than the institutional norm of consensus decisionmaking. There is no question that Bernanke will always have enough votes, and we fully expect him to use these votes to provide further support to the economy if he views it as necessary.
Хатциус не считает наличие трех выступающих против планов смягчения глав федеральных резервных банков препятствием для QE3.
