Про беспочвенно тебе объяснили умник.... дивы уменьшат, большие Инвестиции, Потанин не заинтересован чтобы тебя сделать богатым))бери больше плечей студент
Вне позы вообще по рынку. Все высказали своё мнение, а то что клоуны пишут что пишу чушь, не имея своей чоткой позиции, ну пусть пишет. У тебя хоть понятная позиция.... никель на хае... котира на 13000.
Про беспочвенно тебе объяснили умник.... дивы уменьшат, большие Инвестиции, Потанин не заинтересован чтобы тебя сделать богатым))бери больше плечей студент
Про беспочвенно тебе объяснили умник.... дивы уменьшат, большие Инвестиции, Потанин не заинтересован чтобы тебя сделать богатым))бери больше плечей студент
Вне позы вообще по рынку. Все высказали своё мнение, а то что клоуны пишут что пишу чушь, не имея своей чоткой позиции, ну пусть пишет. У тебя хоть понятная позиция.... никель на хае... котира на 13000.
Вне позы вообще по рынку. Все высказали своё мнение, а то что клоуны пишут что пишу чушь, не имея своей чоткой позиции, ну пусть пишет. У тебя хоть понятная позиция.... никель на хае... котира на 13000.
Скорее всего. Поэтому нельзя исключать до этого спекулятивной высадки на уровнях выше. Выше 10800. Но это спекулятивно и краткосрок совсем. Может быть даже за 1-2 дня. Т.е. нужно либо сидеть в шорте, но защититься от таких рисков с учетом времени и возможного изменения коэф. маржиналки, либо ждать момент. Хз, что правильней. Пока сильная волатила - раздевает по чуть чуть, не настроиться.
Скорее всего. Поэтому нельзя исключать до этого спекулятивной высадки на уровнях выше. Выше 10800. Но это спекулятивно и краткосрок совсем. Может быть даже за 1-2 дня. Т.е. нужно либо сидеть в шорте, но защититься от таких рисков с учетом времени и возможного изменения коэф. маржиналки, либо ждать момент. Хз, что правильней. Пока сильная волатила - раздевает по чуть чуть, не настроиться.
“A Minsky moment is a sudden major collapse of asset values, which is part of the credit cycle or business cycle. Such moments occur because long periods of prosperity and increasing value of investments lead to increasing speculation using borrowed money.”Wikipedia
Global debt has reached a record high, and three countries account for more than half of it, according to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) report released Wednesday. The number reached $164 trillion in 2016. It’s even higher today, as we’ll see in a few charts below but, hey, what's an extra trillion or two amongst friends?
$164 trillion amounts to 225% debt-to-global GDP. As rates rise, borrowing costs rise and with less in the pocket left over to spend, the economy slows. Credible academic studies show the stresses to an economy start at around 90% debt-to-GDP. The IMF said, “The global economy is more deeply indebted than before the financial crisis and countries need to take immediate action to improve their finances before the next downturn.” That’s not going to happen in my view.
But what does this all mean in plain English. How do you explain this to your client? I’ll take a shot at answering that question today by looking at the teachings of the great Hyman Minsky.
Too much debt is a drag on your personal economy. Think of it this way, if your brother earned $100,000 a year and had little debt, his financial stability would be great. If he had a mortgage with payments of $50,000 per year and $30,000 in outstanding credit card debt, costing him $30,000 per year, after taxes, his financial situation would be unstable. On his way from “great” to “unstable,” he had his job income to spend and was able to borrow and buy more things. Think about how his spending helped the economy. Many people did the same. Income plus credit equals more cash to spend until you reach a point that it’s hard to cover your monthly number and you can no longer borrow. And his problem grows worse should interest rates rise unless he can get his income up… but can you see how he’s squeezed.
After reading the IMF report, I came across a well-written piece by Jesse Felder about Hyman Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis. Jesse writes:
After remaining relatively unknown during the course of his lifetime, Minsky really came to fame in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis as his hypothesis helped to explain what left most economists baffled: the fundamental cause of the crisis. Clearly, though, he has been forgotten just as quickly because, considering where we stand today, it’s obvious the economists with the greatest power to prevent another crisis have still not adopted his insights into their frameworks.
To begin to understand the current situation in Minsky terms we must first understand the hypothesis: The first theorem of the financial instability hypothesis is that the economy has financing regimes under which it is stable, and financing regimes in which it is unstable. The second theorem of the financial instability hypothesis is that over periods of prolonged prosperity, the economy transits from financial relations that make for a stable system to financial relations that make for an unstable system. In particular, over a protracted period of good times, capitalist economies tend to move from a financial structure dominated by hedge finance units to a structure in which there is large weight to units engaged in speculative and Ponzi finance.
Next we need to understand what these financing units are: Hedge financing units are those which can fulfill all of their contractual payment obligations by their cash flows… Speculative finance units are units that can meet their payment commitments on “income account” on their liabilities, even as they cannot repay the principle out of income cash flows… For Ponzi units, the cash flows from operations are not sufficient to fulfill either the repayment of principle or the interest due on outstanding debts by their cash flows from operations.
And this is what reminded me of Minsky when I read the recent article in Grant’s (Interest Rate Observer) with the accompanying chart below. It shows the percent of companies in the S&P 500 that would fall into Minsky’s “Ponzi unit” category. Specifically, Bianco Research defines these “zombies” as companies whose interest expense is greater than their 3-year average EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes). Currently, we face the greatest percentage of “Ponzi units” in at least 20 years.
This should be worrisome to investors and even more so to those managing monetary policy because it suggests that financial instability within the economy may be greater than any other time over the past couple of decades. Minsky again: It can be shown that if hedge financing dominates, then the economy may well be an equilibrium seeking and containing system. In contrast, the greater the weight of speculative and Ponzi finance, the greater the likelihood that the economy is a deviation amplifying system.
Those last three words are critical. “A deviation amplifying system,” simply means an economy built on a virtuous cycle that risks evolving into a vicious one. So long as interest rates remain low and investor risk appetites remain strong, zombies will thrive and the economy will, as well, relatively speaking, of course. However, should interest rates rise and risk appetites reverse course, the risk of a self-reinforcing downturn grows. (Emphasis mine)
Minsky explains: In particular… if an economy with a sizeable body of speculative financial units is in an inflationary state, and the authorities attempt to exorcise inflation by monetary constraint [SB here – raising interest rates], then speculative units will become Ponzi units and the net worth of previously Ponzi units will quickly evaporate [SB here -- i.e., your brother is toast]. Consequently, units with cash flow shortfalls will be forced to try to make position by selling out position. This is likely to lead to a collapse of asset values.
Interest rates have been rising for nearly two years now and the Fed seems to have turned its attention from cultivating a wealth effect in the economy by supporting asset prices via quantitative easing to reining in inflation by unwinding those policies and raising the Fed Funds rate. In the process, by way of the Minsky Hypothesis, they may end up undoing everything they strived so hard to achieve over the better part of the past decade.
It’s not hard to imagine just how vulnerable these zombies might be to rising interest rates and waning risk appetites. Should they be forced into liquidation a resulting collapse in asset values could present a major problem for the economy as there are plenty of reasons to believe the wealth effect may be even more powerful to the downside than it was to the upside. Either way, the threat to the economy posed by the greatest corporate zombie army in history is surely enough to make Minsky roll over in his grave.”
Our friends at Greenrock Research put it this way in their excellent second quarter 2018 investor letter, “The Fed has stated their policy. They plan to have three more rate hikes for the remainder of this year and three or four next year. In addition, they will reduce their portfolio of fixed income securities. The Fed did all of this in 1937. The Fed then lowered rates in 1929 in reaction to the depression just as they did in response to the recession of 2008. By 1936 the Fed thought our economy was stable and raised rates in 1937. Luckily for us, our current Fed can look at the mistakes made in 1937 when the stock market fell by 37%. They will need to be very careful; lowering rates creates an immediate solution for the economy, while raising rates is like playing with fire. So, it appears rates are going up, and that is generally not good for our economy.”
I believe the Fed will lead us once again into the next recession. Raising interest rates and selling bonds in a highly indebted “unstable” situation will result in recession. Zombie companies will default. What a great investment opportunity it will create. My best guess on timing: #2019Recession. Data dependent as they say… Keep the “inflation” and “recession watch” charts you’ll find when you click through below on your radar.
Grab a coffee and find your favorite chair. Thanks for reading… Have a great weekend!
“A Minsky moment is a sudden major collapse of asset values, which is part of the credit cycle or business cycle. Such moments occur because long periods of prosperity and increasing value of investments lead to increasing speculation using borrowed money.”Wikipedia
Global debt has reached a record high, and three countries account for more than half of it, according to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) report released Wednesday. The number reached $164 trillion in 2016. It’s even higher today, as we’ll see in a few charts below but, hey, what's an extra trillion or two amongst friends?
$164 trillion amounts to 225% debt-to-global GDP. As rates rise, borrowing costs rise and with less in the pocket left over to spend, the economy slows. Credible academic studies show the stresses to an economy start at around 90% debt-to-GDP. The IMF said, “The global economy is more deeply indebted than before the financial crisis and countries need to take immediate action to improve their finances before the next downturn.” That’s not going to happen in my view.
But what does this all mean in plain English. How do you explain this to your client? I’ll take a shot at answering that question today by looking at the teachings of the great Hyman Minsky.
Too much debt is a drag on your personal economy. Think of it this way, if your brother earned $100,000 a year and had little debt, his financial stability would be great. If he had a mortgage with payments of $50,000 per year and $30,000 in outstanding credit card debt, costing him $30,000 per year, after taxes, his financial situation would be unstable. On his way from “great” to “unstable,” he had his job income to spend and was able to borrow and buy more things. Think about how his spending helped the economy. Many people did the same. Income plus credit equals more cash to spend until you reach a point that it’s hard to cover your monthly number and you can no longer borrow. And his problem grows worse should interest rates rise unless he can get his income up… but can you see how he’s squeezed.
After reading the IMF report, I came across a well-written piece by Jesse Felder about Hyman Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis. Jesse writes:
After remaining relatively unknown during the course of his lifetime, Minsky really came to fame in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis as his hypothesis helped to explain what left most economists baffled: the fundamental cause of the crisis. Clearly, though, he has been forgotten just as quickly because, considering where we stand today, it’s obvious the economists with the greatest power to prevent another crisis have still not adopted his insights into their frameworks.
To begin to understand the current situation in Minsky terms we must first understand the hypothesis: The first theorem of the financial instability hypothesis is that the economy has financing regimes under which it is stable, and financing regimes in which it is unstable. The second theorem of the financial instability hypothesis is that over periods of prolonged prosperity, the economy transits from financial relations that make for a stable system to financial relations that make for an unstable system. In particular, over a protracted period of good times, capitalist economies tend to move from a financial structure dominated by hedge finance units to a structure in which there is large weight to units engaged in speculative and Ponzi finance.
Next we need to understand what these financing units are: Hedge financing units are those which can fulfill all of their contractual payment obligations by their cash flows… Speculative finance units are units that can meet their payment commitments on “income account” on their liabilities, even as they cannot repay the principle out of income cash flows… For Ponzi units, the cash flows from operations are not sufficient to fulfill either the repayment of principle or the interest due on outstanding debts by their cash flows from operations.
And this is what reminded me of Minsky when I read the recent article in Grant’s (Interest Rate Observer) with the accompanying chart below. It shows the percent of companies in the S&P 500 that would fall into Minsky’s “Ponzi unit” category. Specifically, Bianco Research defines these “zombies” as companies whose interest expense is greater than their 3-year average EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes). Currently, we face the greatest percentage of “Ponzi units” in at least 20 years.
This should be worrisome to investors and even more so to those managing monetary policy because it suggests that financial instability within the economy may be greater than any other time over the past couple of decades. Minsky again: It can be shown that if hedge financing dominates, then the economy may well be an equilibrium seeking and containing system. In contrast, the greater the weight of speculative and Ponzi finance, the greater the likelihood that the economy is a deviation amplifying system.
Those last three words are critical. “A deviation amplifying system,” simply means an economy built on a virtuous cycle that risks evolving into a vicious one. So long as interest rates remain low and investor risk appetites remain strong, zombies will thrive and the economy will, as well, relatively speaking, of course. However, should interest rates rise and risk appetites reverse course, the risk of a self-reinforcing downturn grows. (Emphasis mine)
Minsky explains: In particular… if an economy with a sizeable body of speculative financial units is in an inflationary state, and the authorities attempt to exorcise inflation by monetary constraint [SB here – raising interest rates], then speculative units will become Ponzi units and the net worth of previously Ponzi units will quickly evaporate [SB here -- i.e., your brother is toast]. Consequently, units with cash flow shortfalls will be forced to try to make position by selling out position. This is likely to lead to a collapse of asset values.
Interest rates have been rising for nearly two years now and the Fed seems to have turned its attention from cultivating a wealth effect in the economy by supporting asset prices via quantitative easing to reining in inflation by unwinding those policies and raising the Fed Funds rate. In the process, by way of the Minsky Hypothesis, they may end up undoing everything they strived so hard to achieve over the better part of the past decade.
It’s not hard to imagine just how vulnerable these zombies might be to rising interest rates and waning risk appetites. Should they be forced into liquidation a resulting collapse in asset values could present a major problem for the economy as there are plenty of reasons to believe the wealth effect may be even more powerful to the downside than it was to the upside. Either way, the threat to the economy posed by the greatest corporate zombie army in history is surely enough to make Minsky roll over in his grave.”
Our friends at Greenrock Research put it this way in their excellent second quarter 2018 investor letter, “The Fed has stated their policy. They plan to have three more rate hikes for the remainder of this year and three or four next year. In addition, they will reduce their portfolio of fixed income securities. The Fed did all of this in 1937. The Fed then lowered rates in 1929 in reaction to the depression just as they did in response to the recession of 2008. By 1936 the Fed thought our economy was stable and raised rates in 1937. Luckily for us, our current Fed can look at the mistakes made in 1937 when the stock market fell by 37%. They will need to be very careful; lowering rates creates an immediate solution for the economy, while raising rates is like playing with fire. So, it appears rates are going up, and that is generally not good for our economy.”
I believe the Fed will lead us once again into the next recession. Raising interest rates and selling bonds in a highly indebted “unstable” situation will result in recession. Zombie companies will default. What a great investment opportunity it will create. My best guess on timing: #2019Recession. Data dependent as they say… Keep the “inflation” and “recession watch” charts you’ll find when you click through below on your radar.
Grab a coffee and find your favorite chair. Thanks for reading… Have a great weekend!
Автор свою позицию озвучивал не раз. Наши друзь6 с этой ветки не видят риск в высоких процентных ставках США. Это далеко, а я купил на 3 минуты, продал и заработал..
“A Minsky moment is a sudden major collapse of asset values, which is part of the credit cycle or business cycle. Such moments occur because long periods of prosperity and increasing value of investments lead to increasing speculation using borrowed money.”Wikipedia
Global debt has reached a record high, and three countries account for more than half of it, according to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) report released Wednesday. The number reached $164 trillion in 2016. It’s even higher today, as we’ll see in a few charts below but, hey, what's an extra trillion or two amongst friends?
$164 trillion amounts to 225% debt-to-global GDP. As rates rise, borrowing costs rise and with less in the pocket left over to spend, the economy slows. Credible academic studies show the stresses to an economy start at around 90% debt-to-GDP. The IMF said, “The global economy is more deeply indebted than before the financial crisis and countries need to take immediate action to improve their finances before the next downturn.” That’s not going to happen in my view.
But what does this all mean in plain English. How do you explain this to your client? I’ll take a shot at answering that question today by looking at the teachings of the great Hyman Minsky.
Too much debt is a drag on your personal economy. Think of it this way, if your brother earned $100,000 a year and had little debt, his financial stability would be great. If he had a mortgage with payments of $50,000 per year and $30,000 in outstanding credit card debt, costing him $30,000 per year, after taxes, his financial situation would be unstable. On his way from “great” to “unstable,” he had his job income to spend and was able to borrow and buy more things. Think about how his spending helped the economy. Many people did the same. Income plus credit equals more cash to spend until you reach a point that it’s hard to cover your monthly number and you can no longer borrow. And his problem grows worse should interest rates rise unless he can get his income up… but can you see how he’s squeezed.
After reading the IMF report, I came across a well-written piece by Jesse Felder about Hyman Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis. Jesse writes:
After remaining relatively unknown during the course of his lifetime, Minsky really came to fame in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis as his hypothesis helped to explain what left most economists baffled: the fundamental cause of the crisis. Clearly, though, he has been forgotten just as quickly because, considering where we stand today, it’s obvious the economists with the greatest power to prevent another crisis have still not adopted his insights into their frameworks.
To begin to understand the current situation in Minsky terms we must first understand the hypothesis: The first theorem of the financial instability hypothesis is that the economy has financing regimes under which it is stable, and financing regimes in which it is unstable. The second theorem of the financial instability hypothesis is that over periods of prolonged prosperity, the economy transits from financial relations that make for a stable system to financial relations that make for an unstable system. In particular, over a protracted period of good times, capitalist economies tend to move from a financial structure dominated by hedge finance units to a structure in which there is large weight to units engaged in speculative and Ponzi finance.
Next we need to understand what these financing units are: Hedge financing units are those which can fulfill all of their contractual payment obligations by their cash flows… Speculative finance units are units that can meet their payment commitments on “income account” on their liabilities, even as they cannot repay the principle out of income cash flows… For Ponzi units, the cash flows from operations are not sufficient to fulfill either the repayment of principle or the interest due on outstanding debts by their cash flows from operations.
And this is what reminded me of Minsky when I read the recent article in Grant’s (Interest Rate Observer) with the accompanying chart below. It shows the percent of companies in the S&P 500 that would fall into Minsky’s “Ponzi unit” category. Specifically, Bianco Research defines these “zombies” as companies whose interest expense is greater than their 3-year average EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes). Currently, we face the greatest percentage of “Ponzi units” in at least 20 years.
This should be worrisome to investors and even more so to those managing monetary policy because it suggests that financial instability within the economy may be greater than any other time over the past couple of decades. Minsky again: It can be shown that if hedge financing dominates, then the economy may well be an equilibrium seeking and containing system. In contrast, the greater the weight of speculative and Ponzi finance, the greater the likelihood that the economy is a deviation amplifying system.
Those last three words are critical. “A deviation amplifying system,” simply means an economy built on a virtuous cycle that risks evolving into a vicious one. So long as interest rates remain low and investor risk appetites remain strong, zombies will thrive and the economy will, as well, relatively speaking, of course. However, should interest rates rise and risk appetites reverse course, the risk of a self-reinforcing downturn grows. (Emphasis mine)
Minsky explains: In particular… if an economy with a sizeable body of speculative financial units is in an inflationary state, and the authorities attempt to exorcise inflation by monetary constraint [SB here – raising interest rates], then speculative units will become Ponzi units and the net worth of previously Ponzi units will quickly evaporate [SB here -- i.e., your brother is toast]. Consequently, units with cash flow shortfalls will be forced to try to make position by selling out position. This is likely to lead to a collapse of asset values.
Interest rates have been rising for nearly two years now and the Fed seems to have turned its attention from cultivating a wealth effect in the economy by supporting asset prices via quantitative easing to reining in inflation by unwinding those policies and raising the Fed Funds rate. In the process, by way of the Minsky Hypothesis, they may end up undoing everything they strived so hard to achieve over the better part of the past decade.
It’s not hard to imagine just how vulnerable these zombies might be to rising interest rates and waning risk appetites. Should they be forced into liquidation a resulting collapse in asset values could present a major problem for the economy as there are plenty of reasons to believe the wealth effect may be even more powerful to the downside than it was to the upside. Either way, the threat to the economy posed by the greatest corporate zombie army in history is surely enough to make Minsky roll over in his grave.”
Our friends at Greenrock Research put it this way in their excellent second quarter 2018 investor letter, “The Fed has stated their policy. They plan to have three more rate hikes for the remainder of this year and three or four next year. In addition, they will reduce their portfolio of fixed income securities. The Fed did all of this in 1937. The Fed then lowered rates in 1929 in reaction to the depression just as they did in response to the recession of 2008. By 1936 the Fed thought our economy was stable and raised rates in 1937. Luckily for us, our current Fed can look at the mistakes made in 1937 when the stock market fell by 37%. They will need to be very careful; lowering rates creates an immediate solution for the economy, while raising rates is like playing with fire. So, it appears rates are going up, and that is generally not good for our economy.”
I believe the Fed will lead us once again into the next recession. Raising interest rates and selling bonds in a highly indebted “unstable” situation will result in recession. Zombie companies will default. What a great investment opportunity it will create. My best guess on timing: #2019Recession. Data dependent as they say… Keep the “inflation” and “recession watch” charts you’ll find when you click through below on your radar.
Grab a coffee and find your favorite chair. Thanks for reading… Have a great weekend!
Автор свою позицию озвучивал не раз. Наши друзь6 с этой ветки не видят риск в высоких процентных ставках США. Это далеко, а я купил на 3 минуты, продал и заработал..
короче тебя не зацепило... будешь сидеть с активом собирать дивиденд
Внимание! Уважаемые посетители сайта mfd.ru, предупреждаем вас о следующем: ОАО Московская Биржа (далее – Биржа) является источником и обладателем всей или части указанной на настоящей странице Биржевой информации. Вы не имеете права без письменного согласия Биржи осуществлять дальнейшее распространение или предоставление Биржевой информации третьим лицам в любом виде и любыми средствами, её трансляцию, демонстрацию или предоставление доступа к такой информации, а также её использование в игровых, учебных и иных системах, предусматривающих предоставление и/или распространение Биржевой информации. Вы также не имеете права без письменного согласия Биржи использовать Биржевую информацию для создания Модифицированной информации предназначенной для дальнейшего предоставления третьим лицам или публичного распространения. Кроме того, вы не имеете права без письменного согласия Биржи использовать Биржевую информацию в своих Non-display системах.
